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THIRD CIRCUIT HALTS INTERSTATE PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION
IN PENNEAST PIPELINE: STATES AND ENVIRONMENTALISTS
FIND AN ALLY IN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
“The [Eleventh] Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the
States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sover-
eignty, including sovereign immunity.”1
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has historically recognized that, in particular cir-
cumstances, it is necessary for the federal government to seize privately
held property to benefit the public good.2  Known as eminent domain, the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution enables the federal government to
seize private property so long as that property is taken for public use and
the original owner is provided with just compensation.3  Although this
power is traditionally held only by the federal government, Congress dele-
gated its eminent domain power to certain private parties when it enacted
the Natural Gas Act (NGA).4  In order for private parties to exercise this
power, they must adhere to certain processes.  This includes filing con-
demnation suits against any properties that the pipeline developer wishes
to take through eminent domain.5
1. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
146 (1993) (discussing history and interpretation of Eleventh Amendment and
sovereign immunity).
2. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (holding that taking through eminent domain is constitutional if it is
“rationally related to a conceivable public purpose” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984))); see also
Jeremy P. Hopkins & Elisabeth M. Hopkins, Separation of Powers: A Forgotten Protec-
tion in the Context of Eminent Domain and the Natural Gas Act, 16 REGENT U. L. REV.
371, 372 (2004) (“The power of eminent domain is one of the most invasive pow-
ers the government possesses.”).  Although eminent domain is historically a fed-
eral power, it was implicitly conferred to the states as well through the enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Natalie M. Jensen, Note, Eminent Domain and
Oil Pipelines: A Slippery Path for Federal Regulation, 29 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 320,
325 (2017).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”).
4. See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018) (detailing process through
which pipeline developers may exercise eminent domain to facilitate construction
of interstate pipelines); see also Victoria Mazzola, Comment, Putting the Pieces of the
Puzzle Together: The Natural Gas Pipeline Approval Process Is A Procedural Jigsaw, 64
VILL. L. REV. 459, 467 (2019) (highlighting congressional authorization of eminent
domain in NGA).
5. See Mazzola, supra note 4, at 468.
(917)
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A pillar of federalism in the American constitutional system is that
individual states retain some forms of sovereign immunity.6  One example
of this residual sovereign immunity is that states are generally immune
from suit in federal court, and therefore condemnation suits by private
parties, such as pipeline developers, are largely impossible.7  This legal re-
ality for private parties sharply contrasts with the exemption the federal
government enjoys from the Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity
mandate.8  This means that, unlike the federal government, private parties
are unable to hale states into federal court unless the state in question has
consented to that suit.9  Therefore, the NGA creates a paradox for private
parties; although Congress delegated eminent domain powers to pipeline
developers under the NGA, it is unclear whether private pipeline develop-
ers can hale states into federal court to respond to condemnation suits,
thus, frustrating attempts to use the delegated eminent domain power.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently dealt a heavy
blow to natural gas pipeline development with its decision in In re PennEast
Pipeline Co.,10 granting environmentalists and states an unexpected bul-
wark against the NGA in the form of Eleventh Amendment sovereign im-
munity.11  The decision in PennEast Pipeline frustrates one of the integral
purposes of the NGA in order to safeguard states’ Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity.  The PennEast Pipeline decision undoubtedly creates
new hurdles for pipeline developers.  However, the decision also upholds
established precedent recognizing the foundational nature of sovereign
immunity to the United States’ constitutional system, without entirely
6. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
7. See In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d 96, 103–04 (3d Cir. 2019) (iterat-
ing states are generally immune from suit by private parties in federal court).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”).  The federal government is able to hale states into
federal court because, “[a]s part of ‘the “plan of the [Constitutional] conven-
tion[,]”‘ the States consented to suit by the federal government in federal court.”
See PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d 96 at 103 (second and third alterations in original)
(quoting BlatchFord v. Native Vill. of Noatak & Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 779–82
(1991)).
9. See PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 103 (discussing states’ Eleventh Amend-
ment sovereign immunity); see also Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495
U.S. 299, 304 (1990) (“This Court has drawn upon principles of sovereign immu-
nity to construe the Amendment to ‘establish that “an unconsenting State is im-
mune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens
of another state.”’” (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 100 (1984))).  Additionally, in Feeney, the Supreme Court noted that the Elev-
enth Amendment bar to suit is not absolute, in that States may consent to suit by
private parties in federal court. See Feeney, 495 U.S. at 304.
10. 938 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2019).
11. See id. at 103 (holding district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear condemnation suits against New Jersey properties because NGA did not dele-
gate federal exemption to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to private
parties, such as PennEast).
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freezing interstate pipeline construction.12  If Congress wants to delegate
the federal exemption from Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immu-
nity so that pipeline companies can effectuate the condemnation of state
land, it should revise the NGA to say with unmistakable clarity its intention
to do so.13
Starting with a discussion of the history of the NGA, this Casebrief
discusses the Third Circuit’s decision in PennEast Pipeline and the implica-
tions of that decision—both practical and constitutional.  By discussing
several possible interpretations of the NGA that the Third Circuit could
have adopted in its analysis, it is evident the court’s holding lends some
protection to Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity whilst leav-
ing open the possibility of Congress revisiting the NGA.  If weakening the
Eleventh Amendment is necessary for the NGA to serve its full intended
purpose, the Third Circuit has demonstrated it will not be the court to do
so.14
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to the passage of the NGA, the Supreme Court held on multiple
occasions that it was unconstitutional for states to engage in regulation of
wholesome rates of gas and electrical energy moving in interstate com-
merce.15  Congress originally proposed the NGA to allow the federal gov-
ernment to impose regulations in an area the Constitution prevented
states from regulating.16  According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he Natural
Gas Act was designed to supplement state power and to produce a harmo-
nious and comprehensive regulation of the industry.”17  It is evident from
the congressional record at the time of the NGA’s introduction that legis-
12. This point will be expanded on in later Parts of this Casebrief.  As explic-
itly noted by the Third Circuit, pipeline developers can coordinate with the federal
government to have an appropriate federal official file the condemnation suits in
federal court and then transfer the properties to the pipeline developers. See id. at
113.  Additionally, the condemnation suits can be filed in state court, where states
are not immune from suit.  These alternate options are not exhaustive, and each
poses its own respective issues.
13. See id. at 111 (expressing doubt that Congress can abrogate and delegate
exemption to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and declining to defini-
tively answer that question here).  Whether such a delegation would be constitu-
tionally permissible is unclear, though the Third Circuit found the proposition
unlikely. See id.
14. See id. at 113 (“To be sure, such a change would alter how the natural gas
industry has operated for some time.  But that is what the Eleventh Amendment
demands.”).
15. See Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 331 U.S. 682, 689
(1947) (detailing history of NGA and legislative discussions prior to statute’s
enactment).
16. See id. at 690 (discussing original intent of Congress for NGA).
17. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 513
(1949).
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lators had concerns about its drafting, specifically, the potential encroach-
ment on states’ regulatory power.18
Among other things, the NGA delegates the federal government’s
Fifth Amendment power of eminent domain to private parties for the con-
struction of natural gas pipelines, so long as the pipeline developer follows
necessary condemnation practices.19  Eminent domain allows for the fed-
eral government, and parties delegated that power by Congress, to con-
demn and take property against the current owner’s wishes.20  The
purpose of Section 717f(h) of the NGA is to encourage and facilitate the
construction of natural gas pipelines; even though the NGA mainly im-
pacts private parties, its intended purpose is to benefit the public inter-
est.21  Pipeline companies have since successfully exercised this delegated
power against private landowners on a multitude of occasions.22
In PennEast Pipeline, however, pipeline developers met a novel road-
block, in the form of Eleventh Amendment immunity, when attempting to
exercise this delegated power of eminent domain against the State of New
Jersey.23  Typically, to effectuate the taking of property through eminent
18. See Interstate Nat. Gas Co., 331 U.S. at 690 (discussing powers reserved to
states by Congress and “purpose of [the original] restriction”).
19. See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018); see also Mazzola, supra
note 4, at 466–68 (detailing process pipeline developers must comply with in order
to exercise federal eminent domain power).  Developers wishing to exercise the
NGA’s eminent domain power must satisfy a three-prong test:
1) [T]he party must hold a FERC certificate of public convenience and
necessity; 2) the party has not been able to acquire the property rights
required to construct, operate, and maintain a FERC-approved pipeline
by agreement with the landowners; and 3) the value of the property
sought to be condemned must be greater than $3,000.
Mazzola, supra note 4, at 467.
20. See generally Mazzola, supra note 4.
21. See id.  Some of the debates surrounding the original enactment of the
NGA suggest that from the outset, there were concerns about ensuring the NGA
did not overly encroach on the sovereignty of the states. See William J. Flittie &
James L. Armour, The Natural Gas Act Experience—A Study in Regulatory Aggression
and Congressional Failure to Control the Legislative Process, 19 SW. L.J. 448, 452–53
(1965).  For example, Representative Lea, who originally introduced the bill in the
House of Representatives, described the purpose of the NGA as “provid[ing] Fed-
eral regulation, in those cases where the State commissions lack authority, under
the interstate-commerce law.  This bill takes nothing from the State commissions;
they retain all the State power they have at the present time.” Id. at 452 (citing 81
CONG. REC. 6721 (1937)).
22. See, e.g., E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 831 (4th Cir. 2004)
(affirming district court holding allowing gas company to exercise eminent do-
main against eighty-five private landowners to construct interstate gas pipeline);
Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Certain Permanent & Temp. Easements, 777 F. Supp.
2d 475, 481 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., 143 A.3d 1000, 1020 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2016) (affirming order overruling objections of private landowners
whose property was being condemned by gas company for intrastate pipeline con-
struction under eminent domain powers granted by NGA).
23. See In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d 96, 100–01 (3d Cir. 2019) (dis-
cussing generally PennEast’s condemnation suits against properties owned at least
in part by the State of New Jersey).
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domain, the government (and delegated parties) must file suit against the
property owners to receive condemnation orders.24  Normally, this is not a
problem because private parties and landowners are not immune from
suit in federal court by either private parties or the government.  States, on
the other hand, have the protection of Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity.25
The Supreme Court of the United States has, on occasion, provided
guidance on sovereign immunity, including whether Congress can abro-
gate that immunity.26  These decisions have never touched on sovereign
immunity in the context of the NGA.27  In Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak & Circle Village,28 the Supreme Court discussed the requisite test
for congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
when several Native villages filed suit in federal court against an Alaska
state official.29  In summary, the Supreme Court stated “[w]e have repeat-
edly said that this power to abrogate can only be exercised by a clear legis-
lative statement.”30  The Third Circuit in PennEast Pipeline relied heavily
on Blatchford as evidence of the Supreme Court’s “deep doubt about the
‘delegation’ theory itself.”31
24. See § 717f(h).
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
26. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak & Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775,
786 (1991) (discussing congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment sover-
eign immunity in context of federal lawsuit by Indian tribe against Alaska state
official); see also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989).
27. PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 106 (“[T]he Supreme Court and federal
Courts of Appeals have not addressed the precise issue that we have here—
whether condemnation actions under the NGA are barred by Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity . . . .”).
28. 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (holding that statute at issue was not an unmistakably
clear abrogation of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity).
29. See id. at 777.  In Blatchford, Alaska enacted a revenue-sharing statute that
provided payments to Native village governments. Id.  Soon after, the state’s attor-
ney general advised the commissioner that the program should be enlarged to
apply more broadly. Id.  As a result, funding for the program had to be increased
to match the larger scope, and the Native village governments that the statute was
originally designed for failed to receive the original amount of funding promised
to them. Id.  Alaska Native villages initiated the Blatchford litigation, suing the com-
missioner, a state official, seeking the remainder of funding originally promised
under the revenue statute. Id.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court’s initial dismissal, holding there was no violation of the
Eleventh Amendment because 28 U.S.C. § 1362 constituted a congressional abro-
gation of sovereign immunity. Id. at 778.
30. Id. at 786.  In making this point, the Supreme Court relied on its previous
holding in Dellmuth v. Muth. Id. (citing Dellmuth, 491 U.S. 223); see also Dellmuth,
491 U.S. at 227–28 (“To temper Congress’ acknowledged powers of abrogation
with due concern for the Eleventh Amendment’s role as an essential component
of our constitutional structure, we have applied a simple but stringent test: ‘Con-
gress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in fed-
eral court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute.’” (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))).
31. See PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 106.
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The Third Circuit has never decided whether Eleventh Amendment
immunity bars eminent domain condemnation suits filed against the states
in federal court.32  Instead, the Third Circuit relied on several other cir-
cuit court decisions that offered guidance on similar matters, though none
dealt directly with the NGA.33  Generally, these cases suggest a deeply
rooted judicial doubt that Congress can abrogate Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity at all, and any abrogation must be—at the very least—
stated with unmistakable clarity in the language of the statute.34  Accord-
ing to the Third Circuit, the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
is the only court that has considered delegation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment exemption in the context of the NGA.35  There, the court dismissed
the condemnation suits at issue, holding that the Eleventh Amendment
did bar such suits in federal court.36
While the NGA anticipates private parties will exercise the federal
power of eminent domain, it does not contain explicit language regarding
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.37  States, as residual sover-
eigns, have consented to suit in federal court by the federal government,
but have not consented to suit in federal court by private parties.38  There-
fore, the developers in PennEast Pipeline did not know whether they could
effectuate eminent domain power against states in federal court.
II. FACTS
In January 2019, PennEast Pipeline Company LLC (PennEast) took a
major step toward completing the contested $1 billion PennEast interstate
pipeline project, anticipated to stretch from northeastern Pennsylvania to
an endpoint in New Jersey.39  PennEast filed complaints in the United
32. See id.
33. See id. (discussing relevant circuit court opinions); see also United States ex
rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating
that to allow a qui tam relator to sue one of the states in federal court using the
government’s exemption to Eleventh Amendment poses the question of delega-
tion doubted in Blatchford); United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d
279, 294 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding United States lacks power to delegate its exemp-
tion from Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to private parties).
34. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1989) (“Congress may
abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court
only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”).
35. Sabine Pipe Line, LLC v. A Permanent Easement of 4.25 +/- Acres of
Land in Orange Cty., Tex., 327 F.R.D. 131, 144 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (holding Elev-
enth Amendment barred eminent domain suit by private party under NGA against
State property interest).
36. See id.
37. See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018) (lacking reference to Elev-
enth Amendment sovereign immunity).
38. See PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 103 (discussing states’ Eleventh Amend-
ment sovereign immunity); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing
Feeney opinion and principles of sovereign immunity).
39. See In re PennEast Pipeline Co., Civ. A. No.: 18-1585, 2018 WL 6584893, at
*2 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2018), vacated and remanded 938 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2019).
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss4/6
2020] CASEBRIEF 923
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking orders of con-
demnation against 131 properties existing over the proposed route, a
good portion of those located on the border of New Jersey and Penn-
sylvania.40  PennEast, a private party, filed the condemnation suits using
the federal government’s Fifth Amendment eminent domain power, ex-
plicitly delegated to it by Congress in the NGA.41  However, instead of
using this power solely against other private parties and landowners, Pen-
nEast attempted to exercise its delegated eminent domain power against
the State of New Jersey, which possessed interests in forty-two of the
properties at issue.42
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved Pen-
nEast’s proposal for the construction of a 120-mile underground natural
gas pipeline that would originate in northeastern Pennsylvania and termi-
nate at Transco’s pipeline interconnection in New Jersey.43  PennEast’s
website claims that the project “will reduce energy costs and support
thousands of jobs with clean-burning, American energy.”44  FERC ac-
cepted PennEast’s proposal and granted it a certificate for the project,
which PennEast used to file complaints in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey for orders of condemnation of 131 proper-
ties along the proposed pipeline route.45  Of the 131 properties PennEast
sought to condemn, 42 belonged to New Jersey.46  With the exception of 2
properties, New Jersey held non-possessory interests in the majority of
these properties, primarily in the form of recreation or conservation ease-
ments.47  Unlike the private landowners of the 89 other properties, New
Jersey immediately filed a brief claiming sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment, seeking the dismissal of all complaints for condem-
nation orders of properties New Jersey held interests in.48  Additionally,
New Jersey claimed that PennEast failed to satisfy a jurisdictional require-
40. See PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 101 (discussing details of PennEast’s orig-
inal complaints filed in district court).
41. See id. at 99 (“The company obtained federal approval for the project and
promptly sued pursuant to the NGA to condemn and gain immediate access to
properties along the pipeline route.”); see also § 717f(h) (detailing eminent do-
main power).
42. See PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 101.
43. See Overview, PENNEAST PIPELINE, https://penneastpipeline.com/over-
view/ [https://perma.cc/6FKE-NF2Y] (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) (describing key
features of pipeline project from perspective of PennEast Pipeline Company).
44. Id.
45. See PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 100–01.
46. See id. at 101.
47. See id. (discussing property ownership and interests involved).  New Jersey
has long sought to preserve farmland and open spaces, including through its
“Green Acres” program, by which the state purchases land itself or aids local gov-
ernments in purchasing land for preservation. See id. at 101 n.4.
48. See id. at 101 (discussing district court suit procedural history).
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ment of the NGA by making no attempt to contract with the State regard-
ing its property interests.49
The district court rejected New Jersey’s Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity claim, finding that Congress had abrogated New Jersey’s immunity
through the NGA by vesting natural gas companies with eminent domain
power.50  The court additionally found that PennEast had successfully
satisfied the three NGA requirements necessary to condemn the proper-
ties.51  Accordingly, the court granted PennEast’s orders for condemna-
tion and preliminary injunctive relief.52  Subsequently, New Jersey moved
for reconsideration on the issue of sovereign immunity, which the court
denied.53  New Jersey appealed, moved to stay the district court’s decision
and halt PennEast from taking immediate possession of the properties,
and moved to expedite the Third Circuit’s review of the appeal.54  The
Third Circuit granted the motion in part, temporarily freezing the con-
struction of the pipeline and issuing the following decision.55
Instead of deciding whether Congress could delegate the federal ex-
emption from Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, the Third Cir-
cuit interpreted the NGA as conferring only one of two powers necessary
to seize state properties through eminent domain.  The court stated the
first identified power required is the Fifth Amendment’s eminent domain
capability, which the NGA explicitly grants to natural gas companies.56
Second, the court identified the federal government’s exemption from
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity as a separate, distinct, and nec-
essary power.57  Without that second identified power—the federal ex-
emption from Eleventh Amendment immunity—private parties such as
PennEast cannot hale sovereign states into federal court.58  The Third Cir-
cuit interpreted the NGA as delegating only the power of eminent domain
to natural gas companies.59  Therefore, although PennEast seemingly had
49. See id.
50. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., Civ. A. No.: 18-1585, 2018 WL 6584893, at *1
(D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2018) (holding that NGA delegated PennEast the power of emi-
nent domain, including exemption to Eleventh Amendment needed to effectuate
taking of property), vacated and remanded  938 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2019).
51. Id. at 101–02; see also Mazzola, supra note 4, at 468 (discussing NGA re-
quirements for eminent domain).
52. PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 102.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 102–03 (discussing state’s actions following district court holding).
55. Id.
56. See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018).  For a discussion of the
showing a private party must make to exercise eminent domain power, see supra
note 19.
57. See PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 104 (explaining how federal govern-
ment’s “ability to condemn State land” stems from two separate, but essential,
powers).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 111 (“But we need not definitively resolve that question today
because, even accepting the ‘strange notion’ that the federal government can dele-
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the power to condemn state properties using the delegated federal emi-
nent domain power, it could not effectuate the takings of state properties
in federal court because states are immune from suit by private parties in
federal court.60
III. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
Upon review, the Third Circuit agreed with New Jersey, stating the
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide PennEast’s con-
demnation suits against state property interests.61  The Third Circuit iden-
tified that it had jurisdiction to review both the sovereign immunity
question and the question of injunctive relief.62  The court then walked
through New Jersey’s primary argument—that it was immune from suit in
federal court by private parties such as PennEast.63  New Jersey argued it
was immune because, although it had done so with respect to the federal
government, it had not relinquished sovereign immunity with respect to
private parties.64  Furthermore, New Jersey believed any delegation of the
sovereign immunity power by the NGA lacked clarity, thus, making it
ineffective.65
Though the Third Circuit declined to definitively answer whether
Congress could delegate the same exemption from Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity, it stated three reasons to seriously doubt PennEast’s
position.66  First, the court stressed that relevant case law did not support
PennEast’s argument that the federal government could delegate its ex-
emption from sovereign immunity.67  Specifically, the Third Circuit fo-
cused on the Supreme Court’s decision in Blatchford, several decisions by
other circuit courts, and a Texas district court case to illustrate that the
judiciary has consistently declined to extend the exemption to the Elev-
enth Amendment.68
gate its exemption from Eleventh Amendment immunity, . . . nothing in the NGA
indicates that Congress intended to do so.” (citation omitted)).
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
61. Id. at 103.
62. Id. (“We exercise plenary review over a claim of sovereign immunity.”).
63. Id. at 104 (discussing New Jersey’s sovereign immunity argument).
64. Id.  For a discussion of the Eleventh Amendment, see supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
65. Id. at 104.
66. Id. at 105–06.
67. Id. at 105.
68. See id. at 105–07.  PennEast argued that Blatchford was not analogous be-
cause the statute in Blatchford was jurisdictional, as opposed to the NGA which
confers a substantive power of the federal government on private parties. Id. at
105–06.  The Third Circuit rejected this argument, stating the Supreme Court’s
guidance in Blatchford applied because it had nothing to do with the jurisdictional
nature of the statute and instead concerned “the Court’s deep doubt about the
‘delegation’ theory itself.” Id.  Additionally, the Third Circuit relied heavily on
several decisions from other circuit courts that generally prevented the federal gov-
ernment from delegating its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity exemp-
9
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Second, the Third Circuit emphasized the “fundamental differences”
between the federal government and private developers, thus, weakening
any argument that private parties can hale states into federal court pursu-
ant to the federal exemption from Eleventh Amendment immunity.69
Specifically, those charged with commencing suits in the name of the
United States are bound by a constitutional duty that private parties are
not.70  The court emphasized that federal officials are accountable to the
public in a way that private parties are not.71
Regardless of the overarching question of the constitutionality of del-
egation, the Third Circuit agreed with New Jersey, stating that at the very
least, the NGA did not clearly and unequivocally delegate the federal gov-
ernment’s exemption from Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity,
which allows it to hale states into federal court, to natural gas compa-
nies.72  In order to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress must do so with “‘[u]nmistakable’ clarity.”73
The NGA contains no explicit language regarding Eleventh Amendment
tion. Id. at 106.  However, it is important to note that almost all of these
supporting circuit court decisions were decided in the context of qui tam suits and
did not analyze the NGA. See id. (citing to qui tam cases supporting Third Circuit’s
position doubting delegation of Eleventh Amendment exemption).  The only pre-
vious court to consider this Eleventh Amendment question in the context of the
NGA was a district court in Texas.  See id. (citing Sabine Pipe Line, LLC v. A Perma-
nent Easement of 4.25 +/- Acres of Land in Orange Cty., Tex., 327 F.R.D. 131, 144
(E.D. Tex. 2017)).  In Sabine Pipe Line, the district court found that the suit in
question was barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Sabine Pipe
Line, LLC, 327 F.R.D. at 144.  The district court expressed strong doubts that Con-
gress could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment at all. Id. at 142–43 (“The Su-
preme Court has held that Congress cannot abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity simply by enacting legislation under its general grant of Article I legisla-
tive powers.”).
69. PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 105.  The Third Circuit noted that there are
“meaningful differences between suits brought by the United States, an accounta-
ble sovereign, and suits by private citizens.” Id. at 107 (citing Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785 (1991)) (discussing differences between suits
brought by United States and those brought by private parties).
70. See id. (“Suits brought by the United States are ‘commenced and prose-
cuted . . . by those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed[.]”’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999))).
71. See id.
72. Id. at 103–04 (discussing NGA’s silence on Eleventh Amendment sover-
eign immunity).
73. See id. at 107 (explaining that standard for abrogating sovereign immunity
of states).
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sovereign immunity, nor any direct mention of the abrogation thereof.74
Accordingly, the Third Circuit held for the state.75
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In PennEast Pipeline, the Third Circuit defended, and potentially
strengthened, Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity at the ex-
pense of the intent behind the NGA. PennEast Pipeline is a strong warning
to natural gas companies that, despite the considerable federal powers
granted to them, private parties must respect the rights of states as sover-
eigns.76  At the heart of its decision, the Third Circuit emphasized that
“state sovereign immunity goes to the core of our national government’s
constitutional design and therefore must be carefully guarded.”77
Although the Third Circuit explicitly recognized that this decision
would complicate, and perhaps hinder, the natural gas industry’s opera-
tions, the court stated that “[i]nterstate gas pipelines can still proceed.”78
In effect, the Third Circuit weighed the need for caution regarding the
delegation of the federal exemption from Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity against the possible burden on the purpose of the NGA, and
determined that the constitutional interest in protecting Eleventh Amend-
ment sovereign immunity outweighed the possible harms to interstate
pipeline construction.
The Third Circuit could have decided this case in one of several possi-
ble ways based on how it chose to interpret Section 717f(h) of the NGA.79
The Third Circuit adopted an interpretation of the NGA that best safe-
guarded states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.  However,
some commentators have referred to the Third Circuit’s chosen interpre-
74. See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018) (lacking any reference to
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity); see also PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at
111 (stating that NGA shows no unmistakable intention to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment).
75. PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 111 (“But we need not definitively resolve
that question today because, even accepting the ‘strange notion’ that the federal
government can delegate its exemption from Eleventh Amendment immunity . . .
nothing in the NGA indicates that Congress intended to do so.”).
76. See Note, Executive Adjudication of State Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1412
(2020) (“[T]he Constitution created a system of ‘dual sovereignty’: the federal gov-
ernment was entrusted with a certain set of powers, and the states retained every-
thing else as residual sovereigns.”).
77. PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 108; see also Executive Adjudication of State Law,
supra note 76 (discussing historical importance of residual state sovereignty).
78. PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 113 (expressing consideration for concerns
of potential hinderance to the natural gas industry’s operations).
79. See Bernard Bell, Delegation of Eminent Domain Powers to Private Entities: In Re
PennEast Pipeline Co., YALE J. REG. BLOG (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.yalejreg
.com/nc/delegation-of-eminent-domain-powers-to-private-entities-in-re-penneast-
pipeline-co/ [https://perma.cc/FY88-5YA5].  In this article, Bell offers three possi-
ble ways in which the Third Circuit could have interpreted the NGA. Id.
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tation as the “oddest” choice available.80  This resolution is the safest
choice, not the strangest choice.
If the Third Circuit had alternatively interpreted Section 717f(h) of
the NGA more narrowly, it would have risked creating a bright-line rule
within the Third Circuit for whether the NGA grants natural gas compa-
nies the power to condemn state property interests in federal court.  While
a clear-cut result might appear desirable, the high stakes nature of pipe-
line construction cases urges caution in adopting such a holding.81  Addi-
tionally, ample precedent demonstrates the Supreme Court’s continued
aversion to abrogating Eleventh Amendment state sovereignty.82
Interpreting Section 717f(h) of the NGA to grant natural gas compa-
nies both the power of eminent domain and the power to hale states into
federal court would leave states at the mercy of natural gas companies.83
The states would be unable to block unwanted pipeline construction and
would be helpless in protecting their property interests.  Additionally,
such a decision would potentially weaken the sovereignty of states by open-
ing space for other private parties to lobby and argue for their own exemp-
tions to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.  This concern
appeared to play a considerable part in the Third Circuit’s decision, as the
court stated PennEast’s theory of Eleventh Amendment delegation “would
dramatically undermine the careful limits that the Supreme Court has
placed on abrogation.”84  Moreover, the court asserted that it was “loath to
endorse a never-before-recognized doctrine that would produce such a
result.”85
The stakes of this case were notably high—both in terms of constitu-
tional implications and practical consequences.  By holding for the New
Jersey, the Third Circuit indefinitely halted a billion-dollar project ex-
pected to bring substantial energy benefits to residents of both New Jersey
and Pennsylvania within the next decade.86  Alternatively, had the Third
80. See id. (expressing concern that separating power of eminent domain
from power of exemption from Eleventh Amendment is unrealistic because they
are not practically divisible).
81. See id. (discussing high stakes nature of question presented as reason Su-
preme Court might be willing to hear case).
82. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785–88 (1991) (dis-
cussing abrogation of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in context other
than NGA); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that,
under Indian commerce clause, Congress lacked authority to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 231 (1989) (stating that in order
for Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment, it must do so with unmistakable
clarity in language of statute).
83. See Bell, supra note 79 (suggesting Eleventh Amendment argument oper-
ates as protective cloak for State property interests).
84. See In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d 96, 108 (3d Cir. 2019).
85. Id.
86. See PENNEAST PIPELINE, supra note 43; see also David Wochner et al., Pipeline
Projects Face New Questions on Landowner Rights, KLGATES (Nov. 6, 2019, 2:57 PM),
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/1e7e64fd-f505-4baa-85d1-d28d8345
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Circuit held for PennEast, New Jersey would have unwillingly lost forty-two
property interests, and been forced to acquiesce to the construction of an
unwanted natural gas pipeline that might “damage the environment, dis-
place residents, and pose risks to human health.”87
In addition to the practical considerations present in this case, Pen-
nEast Pipeline posed significant dangers to the sovereignty of the states.  To
interpret the NGA’s delegation of the federal government’s eminent do-
main power as also implicitly delegating the federal government’s exemp-
tion to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity would confuse two
distinct powers.88  This would naturally weaken the strength of the Elev-
enth Amendment, because an exemption could be implicitly delegated to
private parties whenever necessary to effectuate the delegation of any
other congressional power.  As noted by the Third Circuit in its discussion
of Blatchford and other district court opinions, “a private party does not
become the sovereign such that it enjoys all the rights held by the United
States by virtue of Congress’s delegation of eminent domain powers.”89
V. IMPACT
By defending the integrity and power of states’ Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity in PennEast Pipeline, the Third Circuit inadvertently
created a plethora of new incentives for those involved in interstate pipe-
line construction.  Notably, the Third Circuit’s decision might serve as a
compelling reason for Congress to revisit the NGA.90  PennEast has not
dfd5/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1f3a6cb7-6260-41bf-bfb3-e43b154c8f
56/Pipeline_Projects_Face_New_Questions_On_Landowner_Rights.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N9LQ-4FE4] (“As PennEast pointed out, requiring condemnation pro-
ceedings for state-owned land to take place in state court could ‘give States uncon-
strained veto power over interstate pipelines . . . the precise outcome Congress
sought to avoid in enacting the NGA.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
87. David Hutter, FERC Approves PennEast Pipeline Petition, NJBIZ (Jan. 30,
2020, 2:28 PM), https://njbiz.com/ferc-approves-penneast-pipeline-petition/
[https://perma.cc/48G8-36FN].
88. See PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 100 (“The federal government’s power of
eminent domain and its power to hale sovereign States into federal court are sepa-
rate and distinct.  In the NGA, Congress has delegated the former.”).
89. See id. at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sabine Pipe
Line, LLC v. A Permanent Easement of 4.25 +/- Acres of Land in Orange Cty.,
Tex., 327 F.R.D. 131, 141 (E.D. Tex. 2017)) (using language of Texas district court
case that carefully examined Blanchford).  The Third Circuit stressed that the dele-
gation of one power of the federal government does not necessarily delegate any
other federal powers, regardless of whether those powers might be required in
order to exercise the delegated power. Id.  To think otherwise would be to con-
flate separate and distinct federal powers. Id.
90. See id. at 113 (“In any event, even if the federal government needs a differ-
ent statutory authorization to condemn property for pipelines, that is an issue for
Congress, not a reason to disregard sovereign immunity.”); see also Pipeline Develop-
ers Beware: Third Circuit Disallows Eminent Domain Over State Lands Under Natural Gas
Act, DUANE MORRIS (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/pipe-
line_developers_beware_third_circuit_disallows_eminent_domain_state_lands_
0919.html [https://perma.cc/DSR3-8WRU] (“Pipeline companies would be ad-
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abandoned the original proposed pipeline route and recently filed a Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.91  Addi-
tionally, FERC recently sided with PennEast’s petition, issuing a
declaratory order stating that the PennEast Pipeline decision threatens to
disrupt interstate pipeline construction.92  If the Supreme Court declines
to grant certiorari, PennEast will have no choice but to reroute the pipe-
line, lobby Congress to change the NGA, or attempt to have a separate
federal official file the same condemnation suits against New Jersey.
All of these options present their own issues and will further delay the
construction of the pipeline.  As the Third Circuit stressed, however, the
Eleventh Amendment’s direct tie to federalist principles outweighs possi-
ble complications for pipeline construction.  The PennEast Pipeline deci-
sion does not entirely freeze interstate pipeline construction within the
Third Circuit.93  Rather, it reminds pipeline developers to respect the
rights and powers of the states when contemplating the construction of
new pipelines.
PennEast Pipeline also created incentives for parties involved in inter-
state pipeline construction battles, including private landowners, states,
environmental groups, and natural gas companies.  The most obvious in-
centive is for natural gas companies to avoid state land when planning
pipeline routes.94  This, in turn, would allow natural gas companies to
avoid the issue altogether, but it would also potentially prevent natural gas
vised to consult legal counsel and to formulate arguments to combat such attempts
in order to prevent the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the NGA from nullifying
the otherwise broad eminent domain power granted to pipeline companies by
Congress.”).
91. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey,
No. 19-1039 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2020).  Furthermore, the Supreme Court signaled inter-
est in hearing the case by inviting the Solicitor General to file briefs in this case
expressing the views of the United States. See PennEast Pipeline v. New Jersey, No. 19-
1039, 2020 WL 3492643, at *1 (U.S. June 29, 2020).
92. See Tom Johnson, FERC Sides With PennEast in Opposing Court Decision That
Pipeline Builder Can’t Use Eminent Domain To Take Public Land, STATEIMPACT PA. (Jan.
31, 2020, 10:36 AM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2020/01/31/ferc-
sides-with-penneast-in-opposing-court-decision-that-pipeline-builder-cant-use-emi-
nent-domain-to-take-public-land/ [https://perma.cc/3NQY-7ZAV].
93. PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 113 (stating PennEast can coordinate with a
federal official to file condemnation suits). Contra Pipeline Developers Beware: Third
Circuit Disallows Eminent Domain Over State Lands Under Natural Gas Act, supra note
90 (“The opinion also gives states, and potentially private parties, a new tool with
which to obstruct future pipeline projects.”).
94. See David Wochner et al., supra note 86 (“In light of these recent develop-
ments, pipeline developers may need to consider providing to FERC additional
detail about the public benefits their projects provide, and pay increasing atten-
tion to the private and public landowners adversely affected by a proposed
route.”); Pipeline Developers Beware: Third Circuit Disallows Eminent Domain Over State
Lands Under Natural Gas Act, supra note 90 (“Going forward, pipeline companies
may want to consider avoiding the use of eminent domain to acquire state-owned
lands when siting pipelines, thereby circumventing the question of state sovereign
immunity altogether.”).
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companies from pursuing the routes they would otherwise choose for cost
or efficiency reasons.  It would also likely result in natural gas companies
condemning more land owned by private owners than they otherwise
would.95  On the other hand, PennEast Pipeline incentivizes states, environ-
mental groups, and private landowners to work together “for the sole pur-
pose of thwarting pipelines.”96
The most direct result of PennEast Pipeline is that the PennEast pipe-
line project will be indefinitely postponed until either the Third Circuit’s
decision is reversed or an alternate solution is reached.97  It is unclear
whether this decision has the potential to cause PennEast to terminate the
project completely.  Currently, PennEast has not issued a statement as to
the route it will take if the Supreme Court declines to hear the case or if it
affirms the Third Circuit’s decision.98  In its opinion, however, the Third
Circuit noted that PennEast could alternatively ask a federal official to file
the condemnation suits in its place, and then have the properties trans-
ferred after they have been condemned.99  Yet, the court suggested that
such a solution might not be the most feasible or prudent option.100
Unless the Supreme Court reverses the Third Circuit’s decision, Pen-
nEast Pipeline will serve as a significant roadblock to the construction of
interstate pipelines.  Within the Third Circuit, interstate pipeline develop-
ers will be forced to respect states’ property interests and be cognizant of
their inability to hale states into federal court to condemn properties.  Al-
though interstate pipeline construction within the Third Circuit might
face a new complexity, PennEast Pipeline reinvigorated the power of Elev-
enth Amendment sovereign immunity and provided environmentalists
and the State of New Jersey with a victory in their battle against an un-
wanted natural gas pipeline.
Fiona Steele
95. Pipeline Developers Beware: Third Circuit Disallows Eminent Domain Over State
Lands Under Natural Gas Act, supra note 90.
96. Id.
97. See PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 113 (“PennEast warns that our holding
today will give States unconstrained veto power over interstate pipelines, causing
the industry and interstate gas pipelines to grind to a halt—the precise outcome
Congress sought to avoid in enacting the NGA.”).
98. See PENNEAST PIPELINE, supra note 43.
99. See PennEast Pipeline, 938 F.3d at 113 (discussing other options PennEast
could take to file the condemnation suits required to effectuate eminent domain).
100. Id. (“Whether, from a policy standpoint, that is or is not the best solution
to the practical problem PennEast points to is not our call to make.  We simply
note that there is a work-around.”).  Practitioners have similarly noted that this
solution is unproven as a realistic solution for pipeline developers. See David
Wochner et al., supra note 86 (“In response, the court suggested that ‘an accounta-
ble federal official’ could file the condemnation action in federal court, and subse-
quently transfer the property to the pipeline company.  However, the court’s
proposed workaround is untested.” (footnotes omitted)).
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